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Detection solution analysis for simplistic spoofing attacks in commercial 
mini and micro UAVs 
Most of UAVs are GPS navigation based aircrafts that rely on a system with lack of security, 
their latent risk against malicious attacks has been raised with the recent progress and 
development in SDRs and GNSS simulation software, facilitating to amateurs the accessibility 
of equipment with spoofing capabilities. The attacks which can be done with this setup belong 
to the category simplistic, however, during this thesis work there are validated different cases 
of successful results under certain GPS receivers’ state or configuration. 
This work analysis several spoofing detection methods found in the open literature, and selects 
the ones which can be suitable for mini and micro UAV technical specifications and operational 
scenario, for proposing a GPS spoofing detection solution developed in the application layer 
of an open source code Ground Control Station software SDK. The detection solution is 
intended to monitor and correlate abrupt, abnormal or unreasonable values of different sensors 
of the UAV with data obtained from available additional sources. 
The conducted tests validate the cases and circumstances where the spoofing attacks were 
successful. Limitations include the lack of mechanisms to access GPS values which can be 
useful for detection spoofing attacks, but reside in the data bit or signal processing layer of the 
GPS and can not be retrieve to the layer where the SDK in computing all data of other sensors. 
 
Keywords: Spoofing detection, simplistic GPS spoofing attack, UAV, Cybersecurity, 
Information and Communication Technology.  
CERCS-code: P170 
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Veaavastus, analüüs ja lahendused lihtsakoelise saatja aadressi võltsimise 
vastu kommertskasutuses olevate mini- ja mikrodroonides  
Enamus droone kasutab lennundusest pärit GPS navigatsiooniseadmeid, millel puuduvad 
turvaprotokollid ning nende riskioht pahatahtlike rünnakute sihtmärgina on kasvanud 
hüppeliselt lähimineviku arengute ja progressi tõttu SDR ja GNSS simulatsioonitarkvara 
valdkonnas. See on loonud ligipääsu tehnikale amatöörkasutajatele, millel on saatja aadressi 
võltsimise jõudlus. Need potensiaalsed rünnakud kuuluvad lihtsakoeliste kategooriasse, kuid 
selle uurimustöö tulemusena selgus, et nendes rünnakute edukuses on olulised erinevused 
teatud GPS vastuvõtjate ja konfiguratsioonide vahel.  
See uurimustöö analüüsis erinevaid saatja aadressi võltsimise avastamise meetodeid mis olid 
avatud kasutajatele ning valis välja need, mis on sobilikud mini- ja mikrodroonide 
tehnonõuetele ja operatsioonistsenaariumitele, eesmärgiga pakkuda välja GPS aadresside 
rünnakute avastamiseks rakenduste tasandil avatud allikakoodiga Ground Control Station 
tarkvara SDK. Avastuslahenduse eesmärk on jälgida ja kinnitada äkilisi, abnormaalseid või 
ebaloogilisi tulemväärtusi erinevates drooni sensiorites lisaallkatest pärit lisainfoga.  
Läbiviidud testid kinnitavad, et olenevalt olukorrast ja tingimustest saavad saatja aadressi 
võltsimise rünnakud õnnestuda. Rünnakud piiravad GPS mehanismide ligipääsu, mida saab 
kasutada rünnakute avastuseks. Neid rünnakuid puudutav info asetseb infovoos või GPSi 
signaalprotsessi tasandis, kuid seda infot ei saa haarata tasandile kus SDK tarkvara haldab kõigi 
teiste sensorite infot.  
Märksõnad: Saatja aadressi võltsimisrünnakute avastus, lihtsakoelised GPS saatja aadressi 
võltsimisrünnakud, Droonid, Küberturve, Info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia 
CERC S-Kood: P170 
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1 Introduction  
Currently, GPS is the Global Navigation Satellite System most used all over the world, a couple 
of decades ago it was a tool used mainly for certain governments or corporate organizations, 
but today particular individuals can easily access to their Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) 
solution; not only because the GPS receivers are every time cheaper and smaller, but also 
because theirs signals are always expected to be found in the Radio Frequency environment of 
the public domain, which means that is freely available, triggering that a wide range of different 
and significant services are designed and rely on GPS. 
Between those services, positioning is not the unique role of GPS in the world, because GPS 
receivers can be synchronized with the extremely precise satellites atomic clocks, users can 
determine time within 100 billionths of a second, capability used for the operation of multiple 
meaningful activities like: financial networks and stock market time stamping, electrical power 
grids, CDMA cell phone towers and digital broadcast radio services [1], even 65 percent of 
NTP stratum-1 servers pool are using GPS for time synchronization. [2].  
On the other side, great quantity of navigation systems has been being designed or redesigned 
in strict dependence or high companionship of the Positioning and Velocity GPS solution, as 
example: broadly all transportation industry; from ADS-B, until map apps on mobile devices, 
going through self-driving cars, maritime navigation or UAVs are using GPS services as main 
positioning system input. 
For instance, GPS is deeply attached to the functioning of our normal daily lives, however is 
not a fully secured system. Back in the seventies, when GPS was designed by the United Stares 
Defence Department, the future relevance and importance of the system for the civilian users 
was underestimated and cybersecurity was not a concern or a situation the designers were 
aware of, so that, security flaws in the fundamentals were going to emerge, which solution 
would require changes in the basics of the GPS architecture. [3] 
The consequences for civilian users is the lack of authentication in GPS signals, reflected in 
the vulnerability that all GPS receivers are subject of, which is being spoofed. Spoofing is the 
injection of counterfeit readable and structured signals in order to provide fake positioning and 
timing information for the end user. Unfortunately, today is easy than ever do this kind spoofing 
attacks, because of recent developments, there has been a substantial decrease in the prices of 
equipment to setup or buy spoofers compared with previous years, consequently, an amateur 
devious malefactor with few resources and knowledge can conduct this attacks unscrupulously.  
The design and constitution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles differs from the other types of 
drones not only because their proliferation and application spectrum is wider, but also because 
during an intentional or unintentional emergency situation, security to people has to be 
warrantied, for the fact that they are flying objects with range and endurance limitations, for 
example, in the case of a power unit failure or a devious communication jamming attack, the 
UAV should land safely because further than it can not simply stay in the air for undetermined 
time, speed and range can propend terrible accidents and incidents, consequently, flight safety 
is vital and must be reassure for  aerial vehicles operations.  
The widespread rising of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles initiated in the military industry, because 
of the clear advantages over manned aviation, essentially that their operational cost was much 
lower, they can enter to environments which may pose risk to the life of the aircraft operator 
and the endurance was extended beyond human limits. These were the upholder reasons that 
next, busted and expanded the phenomenon of UAV towards diverse fields: cinematographic, 
GIS, Search and Rescue, urban surveillance, gas and oil pipelines surveillance among many 
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others; a future can be forecasted when there will no be sky landscape without a couple or 
maybe hundreds of drones flying above us. 
There is a special connotation with GPS in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: the pilot is not on-
board, the aircraft is commanded remotely and usually it is not under any visual control. So, 
further than, GPS has been the most accurate world wide solution to navigate, UAVs have been 
designed under high dependability as the only effective navigation system, raising a latent 
vulnerability for GPS spoofing attacks with notorious high impacts in the operation. 
In the open literature there is a vast library of GPS countermeasures and methods to increase 
security, but very few practical implemented solutions; so worriedly, performing a GPS 
spoofing attack has become a very accessible task but in the other hand detection or mitigation 
solutions appears to be only on scientific literature or used by exclusive or private organization, 
not accessible for an end user public. 
The purpose of this work is to facilitate an immediate response for the problem stated, 
designing and creating a GPS spoofing detection solution, based on multiple techniques in 
different layers of the GPS operation, and applying specially the benefit of networked GPS 
detection solutions. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
From all the GPS dependable and security susceptible industries, there is one particular thing 
of drones, GPS is fundamental to accomplish a successful safe mission, moreover when the 
UAVs flies at distances that the operator cannot track or follow, it is the essential tool to route 
the aircraft displacement and orientation towards the desired destination, not only because the 
operator navigates the vehicles remotely and it is forced to trusts in the information provided 
of the GNSS solution, but also: 
§ GPS does not drift, unlike Inertial Measure Unit sensors, like gyroscopes, 
accelerometers and pitot static systems. 
§ It is not limited by weather conditions as clouds or fog unlike like camera or video 
systems. 
§ It is accurate and precise, not as magnetic compass systems. 
§ Complete GPS modules implementations are compact and portable, suitable for the 
small size and limited payload of UAVs, in comparison to radars, VOR, DME or NDB 
radio navigation systems. 
Alarmingly, GPS authenticity has vulnerabilities by design, and different than the newest 
GNSSs, GPS it is the most popular and widely used, not only because it has been the fully 
operational for more than three decades, but also because specific and detailed description of 
its operation is publicly disclosed. In this situation, one not positive side of the fact that more 
studies, development, research and software has been created it is that low cost equipment can 
be used to create malicious attacks against a wide spectrum of unprotected end users.   
Although, an optimistic forecast is expected with the European GNSS GALILEO that with its 
encrypted navigation service (PRS) for civilian users, will substantially increase the complexity 
to perform a successful spoofing attack. It is not available yet, since it is planned to be fully 
operational until 2018-20 [4].  
There is a big risk when the vehicle does not have pilot on-board and it is mainly navigated 
based on data lacking of authenticity; unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening 
nowadays, because the broadcasting signal which is used for most UAV, is freely accessible 
and transmitted unencrypted, thus the feasibility for this services to be deviously disrupted is 
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very high, furthermore, recent development on SDRs and the disclosure of free GPS simulator 
software, makes easier the task to conduct a spoofing attack to GPS. 
The GPS spoofing detection and mitigation solutions do not have practical implementations, 
most of the solutions are theoretical, or are for exclusive, proprietary or private use, therefore, 
most of UAV are dispensing of a proper countermeasure making them vulnerable to an easy-
to-do attack, additionally, end users and drone operators have not situational awareness of 
threats, posing a latent risk for UAV flights. There is an existent asymmetry of the easiness of 
performing a GPS spoofing attack against the unavailability of an implemented solution to 
protect from it. 
1.1.1 Motivation  
This work describes an analysis and a proposed a software solution for the uprising problem of 
the todays easiness to perform a GPS spoofing attack. The reason for conducting this research 
is the latent security gap in a satellite navigation system that is fundamental and necessary for 
the accomplishment of UAV missions.  
For example, in case of GPS failure caused by unintentional reasons like GPS chipset damage 
or unintentional interference, the usual emergency procedure implies return home; so even if 
the system has video link capabilities and the landmarks on the terrain can be compared with a 
priori saved maps in the GCS, the pilot manoeuvring capabilities are tested, and there is high 
uncertainly for avoid accidental endings. Worst situation is if this GPS signals are effectively 
spoofed, because in this case there is complete incapability for the pilot to maintain flight 
safety; except if a detection solution can alert from the attack and the aircraft is set into manual 
mode, then a similar procedure as the GPS failure can be followed, the problem is that no such 
a detection solution is yet implemented. 
Between all the disastrous situations, hypothesis examples can be: force the UAV to fly until 
runs out fuel until crash, force the aircraft to fly into prohibited or restricted areas like airports 
or make the UAV fly outside national boarders, trespassing into other county airspace. 
Such security threats can pose a grave challenge to UAVs in delivering safe flights, an example 
is the debatable and controversial case of the hijacked US drone in Iran disclosed real 
possibilities for a UAV to be stolen by injecting counterfeit GPS signals. Although this was 
one of the first successful attacks claimed to be done by spoofing GPS, there is not certain or 
official verifications that the incident happened caused by this means, however academics state 
that it could have been done [5]. 
1.1.2 Research questions 
How can GPS navigation be more secure against GPS spoofing attacks in mini and micro 
UAVs?  
RQ1: In what circumstances are mini and micro UAVs vulnerable or susceptible to GPS 
spoofing attacks?  
What types of GPS spoofing attacks are? What are the prominent threat vectors for a UAV 
which uses GPS to navigate?	How vulnerable are a GPS navigation based UAV to this threat 
vector?   
RQ2: How can a software implementation actively detect GPS spoofing attacks in mini/micro 
UAV flights?  
What solutions or theories can detect GPS spoofing attacks? What solutions can be integrated 
in a single algorithm that detects GPS spoofing attacks suitable for the technical specifications 
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of mini/micro UAVs? What type of procedures can be executed once GPS spoofing attacks 
have been detected to ensure flight safety in UAV?  
RQ3: How effective is the GPS spoofing detection software solution?	 
In what scenarios can the GPS spoofing detection algorithm work? What is the applicability of 
this software solution? What limitations does the software solution have? 
1.2 Risk overview  
Navigation is the act of finding and directing from one place to another, for UAV, GPS is an 
essential tool to achieve the desired destination. In order to identify, analyse and prevent from 
the GPS spoofing attacks with more impact and likeliness in mini and micro UAV, it is 
necessary to overview and understand its threat vectors, vulnerabilities and risks. 
1.2.1 Threat vectors 
A GPS spoofer like a GPS jammer are devices that cannot be bought by that names, although 
there are multiple options to purchase a Privacy Portable Device that in the case of the Jammer 
is essentially the same. On the other hand, a GPS spoofer is not as simple as a device that 
broadcast noise to produce a Denial of Service; a GPS spoofer has to emit structured and 
readable signals that emulate a complex moving satellites constellation.  
Cracking the GPS as a system has been doing gradually, it can be reflected on decreasing price 
of the commercial GNSS simulators, in 2008 was about 400.000 USD [6] today can be acquire 
from approximately 4000 USD; even more recently, open source software has been made 
available that requires about 400 USD for special hardware; this equipment acquired by 
scientist, researchers, academicians, or hobbyist as well as by unscrupulous malefactors.  
Different type of attacks can be achieved depending on the means the threat actor uses to inject 
fake GPS signal into a UAV receiver 
The first option is to make and configure your own GPS spoofer. The resources needed for this 
script kiddie level device are a SDR card, transmission antenna and a laptop. Besides this, today 
there is only one available open source freeware that creates the binary GPS stream to be 
transmitted1, the rest are only partially finished projects online. All the equipment can be 
obtained by approximately 1000 EUR plus basic knowledge on GPS is necessary. This 
implementation it is limited to perform only a Simplistic GPS attack. 
Secondly, the attacker or threat actor, can use a commercial hardware or software GNSS 
simulators. These devices made essentially for research and testing are sold without 
restrictions, and the prices start from approx. 4000 EUR to even ten of thousands for a more 
sophisticated solution. Some equipment is already offering real time signal generation. 
Following commercial simulator, the threat actor could take advantage of the developments 
done by university level research groups. In 2012, it was estimated that 100 universities were 
capable enough to develop a sophisticated spoofer within a year of dedicated effort. [3]. Today, 
this task should be accomplished much faster due to the constant developments of free SDR 
based GNSS receiver software 2.  
                                                
1 https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sim-sdr	 
2 https://github.com/gnss-sdr/gnss-sdr 
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Finally, the fourth GPS spoofing source can be through the capacity of a private corporation or 
government level. The information about the GPS spoofing capabilities is classified, but can 
be assumed that can have access to sophisticated spoofers, considering they usually are 
developing cutting military edges technologies and count with practically no limitation in 
recourses [8]. 
1.2.2 Vulnerabilities 
GPS as system 
Civil GPS as a system miss security concept in the nature of its design which allows exploitable 
vulnerabilities. Standard receivers have the task of detecting a satellite signal sent from 
satellites orbiting the earth at roughly 20’000 kilometres of altitude, the received signal strength 
RSS on the Medium Sea Level is about -130 dBm, which is weak enough to be disrupted by 
thick cloud coverage, make it unavailable indoors, or be easily overwhelmed or overlapped by 
different that the legit sources. [9] In addition, detailed and specific technical data of its 
operation is widely available, like PRN signals, transmit frequency, signal bandwidth, Doppler 
range, signal strength, almanac and ephemeris; so there is not secrecy of the GPS operation for 
a deep understanding of the system, facilitating the functions emulation and architecture design 
to construct a spoofer. In the same way, GPS receivers have an AGC that balances power by 
automatically selecting the strongest available signal, propending the vulnerability of acquiring 
the stronger spoofed GPS signal [8]. 
The danger starts immediately after the spoofer captures the correlation peak of the target 
receiver, the spoofer induce a fake position and velocity, taking control and command of the 
drones heading, because the spoofer operator effectively has broken the UAV autopilot 
feedback control loop [10]. 
In the L2 signal a GPS spoofing attack is nearly impossible because the military signals are 
encrypted and therefore unpredictable for a spoofer, all it can be done it capture and replay 
existing signals (meaconing attack), instead, the civil GPS signal is publicly known and readily 
predictable [10] [11]. 
UAV operations  
Nearly in every occurrence, nor the pilot or the autopilot software is aware when there are GPS 
spoofing attacks, because if conducted properly, the transition from using legit to fake signals 
will be end user transparent; [3]. In a not transparent transition, will be notable a period of time 
without service, cause by a force reacquisition technique; it has not necessarily to raise concern 
of spoofing or attack because interference of signals is produced not only intentionally but 
produced unintentional, caused by solar radiation bursts or by equipment broadcasting 
carelessly or uncontrolled signals in the same frequency of GPS. 
Once interference is detected during a UAV flight flights, it is not unusual to have temporal 
interference in the GPS frequency, however, once alerted by the software, the situation can be 
overcome by conducting some flying manoeuvres or by following the stipulated emergency 
procedure. Initially, the navigation should be manual, considering the autopilot is based on the 
not available or not trustworthy GPS coordinates; for the case Line-of-Sight LOS drones, one 
of the procedures is to follow the transmitted beam of the communication channels towards the 
broadcasting origin, which is essentially a known reference location where usually a directional 
antenna is located; for the Beyond-Line-of-Sight BLOS drones, the satellite communication 
channel is encrypted and provides alternative geolocation. 
If during a UAV flight a spoofing attacks is detected, the operation will be cancelled because 
UAV navigation is not trustworthy, but the possibility of an accident to happened is highly 
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reduced rather than if there is not countermeasure; however, if there would be mitigation 
implemented, the operation could continue bemuse the fake signals will be filtered out. 
Pilots and software currently used to fly drones are blind trusting in the legitimacy of the 
obtained GPS PVT solutions, because there is not situational awareness or implemented 
detection mechanisms in the commercial micro/mini UAV that alert the presence of possible 
GPS spoofing attacks.  
Although a simplistic GPS spoofing attack is the easiest one to detect, there has not even been 
sufficient acknowledgment of the spoofing threat from the manufactures to implement 
detection mechanisms for this type of attack or for end users to know the vulnerabilities and 
risks they are susceptible when flying a drone, therefore, there is an asymmetric proportion 
between the todays easiness to perform simple GPS spoofing attack and the few available 
practical and implemented solutions to protect from it. 
The only known commercial manufacture that has recently released a firmware version with 
antispoofing detection solution is U-Blox. On February 2016, the new 3.01 firmware version 
for the 8M series of the GPS chipsets is launched, this software has the capability to flag 
possible GPS spoofing situation. The detection solution algorithm relies on multiple GNSS and 
is no fool proof1 [12].   
When attacking there can be two main objectives: (1) fooling the receiver, by means of 
successfully inject fake signal into the hardware and software of the UAV, or (2) fooling the 
operator, where the pilot is not aware that is under attack, and therefore does not react 
accordingly. If there is not any countermeasure implemented, the pilot as well as the autopilot 
are completely unprotected to succumb. If there is a detection technique implemented the attack 
will be flagged, so even if the UAV autopilot is fooled, the operator will be alerted and will be 
able to act in order to protect the safety of the mission, for example by changing the flight mode 
to manual where GPS is not used. The safest mission is when a mitigation solution is available, 
so nor the pilot or the autopilot will be fooled with the spoofing attack. It is important to remark 
that this hypothesis contemplates ideally effective countermeasures that in practice are not 
considered to exist. 
To conclude, there is a latent security vulnerability for all the mini/micro drones that are using 
GPS to navigate, moreover today, that resources are not a barrier when the threat actor can use 
cheap SDR cards and freeware downloadable on internet.  
1.2.3 Risk 
In this section will be mentioned practical factors that can affect the impacts of the attack and 
the operational risks a UAV is subjected when using GPS to navigate.  
The impact in the operation objectives can be significant, varying from permanent to temporal 
disruption on the mission, like:  
§ Stealing the aircraft, by hijacking the navigation system and making it land in attacker 
desired location, as claimed by the Iran case in 2011 [3]. The aircraft should be flying 
outside the operator sight monitoring range in order to avoid the pilot change the flight 
mode into manual. Additionally, the injection of the counterfeit PVT solution has had 
to be meticulously planned and the provided the spoofer have to learn the target flight 
pattern, if and a stable covert post-capture is desired [13].  
                                                
1 https://www.u-blox.com/en/press-release/u-blox-m8-multi-gnss-receivers-achieve-higher-level-performance-
embedded-security 
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§ Crashing the aircraft, by injecting fake elevation values into the GPS, in a usual 
autopilot behaviour the aircraft will dive to reach the commanded altitude, although 
there are barometric altitude sensors, they are not as accurate as the GPS elevation, 
therefore, usually GPS solution prevails as a reference. This could be accomplishing by 
injecting altitude values lower than the ground elevation, so the autopilot will try to 
reach the desired height of flight, making the aircraft to dive into a crash.  Crashing is 
easier than controlling. 
§ Confusing, disorientating or misleading the aircraft trajectory, disqualifying the 
capacity to properly conduct the mission, considering that the UAV will not be able to 
accurate point, follow and track on specific area, by injecting randomly fake PVT data 
into the receiver target. 
There is not a fool proof solution for securing GNSS from spoofing, securing GNSS signal 
authentication is about conjugate existing mitigation and detection techniques and set them up 
with the appropriate thresholds, becoming them a fundamentally a problem of statistical 
decision theory, to accurate understanding possible false alarm [14]. 
1.3 Project context definition 
There is a wide variety of environments and conditions that can make the difference when 
conducting the GPS spoofing attack. In this sense, it is important to narrow the extent of the 
project and define the scheme, the function, the use, the creator and the recipient for this 
situation. In this section will be distinct the circumstances where the analysis and the final 
software solution will have applicability.  
Although most UAV are using GPS to navigate [15], for the purposes of this analysis, it is only 
taken into consideration the Micro/Mini UAV groups, with some applicable extended until the 
Short Range (SR) subgroup, excluding all UAVs placed above of the Tactical category. The 
reason for discarding Tactical, Strategic and Operational Task UAVs is because they are of 
exclusive use, their distribution spectrum is outside the range of an average person (the threat 
vector for this thesis), and they belong mostly to intergovernmental organizations or particular 
companies, because of elevated prices, high maintenance costs and restricted sale. 
Additionally, Tactical, Strategic and especial task UAVs are less prone to GPS amateur attacks 
than mini/micro UAVs because: 
§ Their operational scenario is located in remote or restricted areas like vessels, jungle or 
military compounds, so that, physical security covers wide ranges from their take-off 
or landing location, in addition, their maximum and operational altitude can exceed 
3000 meters, making the interaction with public not likely.  
§ Their position can be provided by different sources than GNSS, like the encrypted 
satellite communications telemetry channel or alternative ground based triangulation 
stations. 
§ Because of the more Maximum Take of Weight capabilities, they can carry more 
variety or robust equipment, like radio navigation instruments like the conventional 
aircrafts, which may provide alternatives to navigate without GPS.  
§ They are flown by skilled pilots, which require certifications and certain experience to 
fly, so that, they are prepared to identify and react for emergencies, besides the fact that 
the software of the control station and the firmware of the aircraft is smart to manage 
different contingency scenarios.  
On the other hand, mini/micro UAV subgroup have flexibility and dynamic components, are 
relatively cheap and have worldwide commercialization, becoming them in the adequate group 
to test and experiment. Besides that, mini/micro UAVs have great advantages when developing 
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customized applications because are usually operated under open source software licences, 
have big development and support communities online, different manufactures use same 
standard software and protocols, they have detailed manuals and their patches and upgrades 
distribution can be applied immediately, also there are multiple options for spare parts and new 
version hardware can be bought and adapted without changing the drone architecture. 
Following the logic for the UAV subgroup selection, the spoofer used for this project will be 
the most affordable and easy to implement and manipulate for an amateur threat actor. This 
spoofer is setup using SDR cards and free software, and its attacking capabilities the 
corresponds to a simplistic spoofing attack.  
The final user of the contributions proposed in this work, can oscillate since a well versed 
hobbyist until some who ignores the technical details and basics of UAV systems, or from a 
professional video shooting operator until a traditional drone user that has not GPS knowledge 
to interpret suspicious GPS spoofing signs like constant intermittent signal in clear sky, abrupt 
discrepancies between sensors, or uncontrolled displacement of the drone caused by fake 
coordinates into the autopilot software.  
The attacker is a devious amateur individual that is going to take advantage of the commodities 
of technological developments that today facilitate to anyone to competence of creating a GPS 
spoofer, to interfere with the normal happening of a UAV mission.  
The location for the attack to be performed is anyplace outdoors where even restricted, there is 
not strict control of emission in the Radio Frequency environment from the authorities. In 
general, there is contemplated ideal to normal conditions, with a flexible but not extreme 
weather and without third cases interferences of signal obstructions. Additionally, range and 
distance between actors will no be relevant considering it depends mostly on the antenna [16]. 
1.4 Related work  
Several detection techniques have been proposed in the open literature by different research 
Groups and universities [3,6,8,9,10,11,17,18,24,31,33] On the Requirements for Successful 
GPS Spoofing Attacks, Assessing the Spoofing Threat], in this works the spoofer used to 
validate the spoofing attacks or the detection theories are custom or property receiver-based 
spoofers or high-end GNSS simulators; nevertheless, some detection theories are only 
theoretical and not implemented. 
The work done by the Radio Navigation Department of the University of Texas, with several 
papers describes the vulnerabilities and details capture and control of an Unmanned Aircraft 
[17], highlighting work when successfully spoofed a drone in a distance of about 600 meters 
with the own developed intermediate spoofer [10]. 
ETH Zurich, with the paper “On the Requirements for Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks”, 
considers attacks on single and groups of GPS receivers and discuss topics as the require 
precision on the attackers spoofers signals. The hardware used is the GSS7700, capable of 
simulating two constellation of SV, where on simulates legit GPS signal and the other one 
simulates the signals of attacker [11].  
Important event happened during the DEFCON23, Unicorn team, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. 
Ltd., presented how anyone could perform a GPS spoofing attack, by using SDR cards and a 
MATLAB code not disclosed that simulated the GPS signal. However, recent software of 
Takuji Ebinuma is available for downloading in GitHub. 1
 
 
                                                
1 https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim]. 
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Oleg Petrovsky, Senior Security Researcher of HP realised the paper “Map is not a territory: 
How to spoof GPS on a shoestring” on February 2016. This paper shows the effectiveness of 
the SIM-GPS software on different version of GPS chipsets of the same manufacturer and some 
mobile devices, however focus mainly on the precision needs of a specific SDR card, and the 
tests are done without considering that the receiver can be locked already into the correlation 
peak of legit GPS signals, situation that would normally happened when flying a drone 
outdoors [18]. 
All works above only consider and focused on attacks of intermediate or in some cases 
sophisticated GPS spoofing attacks, which are more effective and difficult to detect but also, 
are more difficult to implement than simplistic attacks; an analysis for that recent publicly 
disclosed GPS spoofing threats is disregarded, moreover, there is not any solution proposed for 
the case of mini and micro UAVs. 
1.5 Objectives and contributions 
The main objective of this thesis is to increase the security of flights in GPS navigation based 
UAVs by the delivering the following contributions (1) An analysis of the effects and detection 
techniques of GPS spoofing attacks in UAVs and (2) creating the design and the 
implementation of a monitoring solution suitable for the performance specifications of mini 
and micro UAV, aimed to detect their prominent GPS spoofing threat vector. 
The research is focused on proposing a software solution based on the different GPS spoofing 
detection methods found in the open literature that will be implemented in a mini/micro UAV 
platform. The solution approaches the problem from different layers of the GPS operation 
architecture and will have a scalable design for similar commercial UAVs. Herein, the word 
“prominent”, refers to the easiest spoofing attack to setup, therefore it is the one with more 
likeliness to happen for this type of UAV, considering the recent developments in SDRs and 
the realising of free GPS simulation software.   
For the present paper, the analysis has been performed in Line of Sight propagation 
environment and no over-the-air tests were conducted to avoid violating possible FCC 
regulations by broadcasting in the GPS band; hence, the transmission hardware will not be 
discussed further, but there is a description of the controlled environment setup. 
The scope of the thesis discards any mitigation capabilities, and as any other of the 
countermeasures, the solution is not expected to be fool proof. The solution design is the result 
of the conjugation of GPS spoofing detection methods, selected by the limitations on standard 
mini/micro UAV hardware and application complexity. The implementation will be done based 
on a commercial default configuration UAV that has open source software development model 
1.  
During the validation process, the GPS spoofing attack will be based on the easiest-to-get 
spoofer, capable only to conduct a simplistic attack. Security or availability in communication 
telemetry channels, additional kinetic or non-kinetic attacks, indoor scenarios, irregular 
weather or unusual environmental conditions will not be relevant for the analysis of the project 
or operational schema. 
1.6 Methodology 
To solve the problem statement, it will be used the Design	Science	research	methodology.  
                                                
1 https://3dr.com/open-source/ 
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The first stage is a research, in the open literature, about the state of the art of the problem 
statement and its extent: a clear picture has to be found out of the different GPS spoofing attacks 
and detections solutions in the UAV context, characteristics and technical limits. The purpose 
is to gather and identify and analyse the available countermeasures that can detect the attacks, 
to comprehend how do they work and interact within different variables.  
During the research process specific and technical information about the functioning of the 
GPS technology will acknowledge, to understand the capabilities and limitations of the UAV 
hardware and software that will be used in the project.  
Considering the vast literature available in the topic, the sources will be mainly found on 
internet: withe and grey literature, academic search engines, research institutes online sites, 
universities publications, journals and scientific magazines.  
Once there is a clear overview about the GPS spoofing attacks types and solutions, the second 
stage will be classifying and comparing which of that solutions can be combined in a single 
detection software suitable for the technical specification if the mini and micro UAV 
categories, and discard the solutions that will not be employed either for high complexity or 
not practical use.  
After identifying and validating the vulnerabilities of the UAV for the prominent GPS spoofing 
threat vector, the next stage is where the designing and implementation of the GPS spoofing 
detection solution will take place. This is solution will be based on the open source SDK of the 
Command and Control software of a particular UAV platform and will integrate the detection 
techniques selected in previous step. 
Finally, the evaluation method will be a controlled experiment that will prove the efficacy of 
the GPS spoofing detection solution in the setup used to identify the UAV vulnerabilities. The 
validation setup is based on real scenario in a controlled environment and the tests would be 
limited by the local regulations of broadcasting RF signals.  
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2 State of the art of GPS spoofing detection in UAV  
In this chapter is described the state of the art of GPS Spoofing detection in UAV. Firstly, there 
is a research and classification about the theoretical solutions for detecting GPS spoofing 
attacks found in the open literature. 
Secondly, there is an overview of GPS Spoofing detection research groups in different 
universities, overview description of implemented available solutions, and related work done 
by security research or academics in the field. 
2.1 Technical Background  
Technical overview on Global Positioning System functioning, UAV operational 
categorization and GPS spoofing attacks are explained in this chapter in order to understand 
the key concepts for this thesis project. 
2.1.1 GPS technical overview 
GPS is a satellite dual use navigation system designed and developed in the seventies by the 
Department of Defence of the United States. It provides separate services for the military and 
the civil users. The Standard Positioning Service SPS broadcasted at 1575.6 MHz (L1 signal, 
unauthenticated) and is designed for the use of the civilian community modulated by the C/A, 
whereas the Precise Position System PPS transmitted at 1227.6 MHz (L2 signal, authenticated) 
and is designed to be used by US military and selected government agencies (it does not mean 
that it is used by all military institutions), L2 signal in modulated by P code that offers 
additional encryption capabilities. 
The system consists of 31 satellites constellation that omits the earth with the purpose of 
providing an uninterrupted PVT solution anywhere in the world, using the Time of Arrival 
(TOA) range concept to determine receivers position.  
TOA range concept involves measuring the time taken for a signal transmitted by the satellite 
to reach the receiver in a known location. This time, known as propagation time, is multiplied 
by the speed of the signal, speed of light, to obtain the distance travelled. When is calculated 
the distance of more than four emitters is possible to obtain a 3D location of the receiver, by 
solving an equation system. The more satellites are used to determine the PVT solution the 
results the more accurate the results are. 
The resulting distances are also related to an imperfect alignment of the receivers’ time scale 
to the satellites accurate atomic clock time scale. Each satellite transmits within the 1575.42 
MHz frequency, but it is distinguished because is modulating the signal with different ranging 
codes, identifiable with an equivalent and unique PRN number. 
Corse/Acquisition (C/A) code 
Transmitted at 1.023 Megabits per second, each satellite has a unique PRN code that only 
correlates when they are almost precisely aligned within alike one. There is no possible and 
alignment between of satellites PRN codes.  
Navigation Message  
C/A and P code signals are modulated at 50 Hz, to obtain the navigation message. This message 
has necessary information to obtain precise transmission time (almanac) and location of each 
satellite (ephemeris). It also contains information that may be required to to assist the 
equipment in acquiring new satellites, to translate from GPS system time to UTC and 
indications to correct for a number of errors that affect the range measurements. The entire 
message broadcast requires uninterrupted 12.5 minutes of transmission [19]. 
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Signal Acquisition and Tracking Phase 
After the GPS reviver is turned on, there is a series of steps that must happen before it can 
access to the information of the signal and provide a PVT solution. Most of this steps occurs 
in the acquisition phase, making it more complex and recourses expensive than the tracking 
phase because it has to search and match the signals in wide spectrum.  
During the acquisition, the receiver performs a search in two dimension. Firstly, it needs to 
find the Doppler offset and where is the beginning point of C/A code [19]. To accomplish this, 
it searches for the correlation peak in the signal by trying al possible values in the 1023 possible 
slots in the Pseudo Random Number PRN of each satellite, in addition, it has to search in a 
frequency range of ± 10kHz due to the Doppler effect. After that, the receiver sets an internal 
clock to match the correlation peak, at this point there is a synchronization between the receiver 
internal clock and the satellite atomic clock. 
Once the signals are acquired, the tracking phase two loops are required to track each satellite 
signal. One loop tracks the beginning of the C/A code or pseudo-ranges, this is known as DLL; 
the other one tracks the Doppler carrier or pseudo-rates known as FLL [20]. 
Time to First Fix (TTFF) 
The time to first fix (TTFF) is the time required for a GPS receiver to obtain satellite signals, 
navigation data and calculate its current position (fix) since the acquisition phase has started. 
To calculate a two dimensional position, the receiver needs to know the position of at least 
three satellites and calculate their distance to them. The position of a satellite is calculated 
based on ephemeris data, which is very precise orbital and clock correction data for the satellite. 
Each satellite broadcasts only its own ephemeris data within a navigation message. The 
navigation message contains also almanac data that is used by the receiver to predict 
approximate positions of the satellites. The usual cold, warm and hot start types used to 
calculate the TTFF are not definite in any official standard.  
In a cold start, the receiver has not saved its last time or position, and doesn’t have almanac or 
ephemeris data. Typically, a cold start is performed whenever the receiver has been powered 
down for more than two weeks or the battery backup of the memory is lost. The complete 
navigation message is not necessary. Considering the transmission rate of 50 bps for each 
satellite to send its 900 bits long navigation data message, the minimum time to achieve a cold 
start 18 seconds, although an expected average could about 45 seconds. 
A warm start is performed whenever the receiver has stored useable almanac data, time and the 
its last position. While the ephemeris data is missing, it has to be downloaded it from at least 
three satellites, similar process as the cold start, and same minimum of 18 seconds time. 
Almanac data allows the receiver to predict which satellite signals it should be able to receive, 
and thereby, the receiver can acquire signals faster then in a cold start.  
A hot start happens when the GPS receiver has ephemeris and time previously stored. The 
receiver gets the signal of at least three satellites and calculate the position. Reported time for 
manufactures is usually from 1 to 3 seconds range [21]. 
2.1.2 GPS Spoofing attacks types 
Spoofing is the intentional transmission and injection of counterfeit GNSS signals into a GPS 
receiver for providing false Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) solution. The goal of GPS 
spoofing is to stealthily force a receiver to track a devious signal. 
Based on the spoofer architecture, GPS spoofing attacks can be categorized in [6]:  
2.1.2.1 Simplistic attack via GPS signal simulator: 
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 It the simplest of the attacks. Basically is the transmission of GPS signals into the radio 
frequency spectrum. The generated signals are not synchronized with the legit GPS signals, 
meaning that if the receiver is in tracking phase, the counterfeit signals will not be acquired by 
the receiver, therefore the fake packets injection will never be used to calculate the PVT 
solution, unless there is a conducted a forced reacquisition technique. On the other hand, if the 
receiver is in acquisition mode there might be a chance to perform successful attack. This attack 
can be achieved by using GNSS simulator, equipment of commercial distribution which prices 
have been decreasing significantly in the previous years, today the can be bought from 
approximately 4000EUR. In addition, recent development in Software Defined Radio hardware 
and GNSS open-source freeware, are lowered the price of setting up a GPS simulator by 
roughly 400 EUR. In this section is included the meaconing attacks, that are record and replay 
the complete GPS frequency in the RF spectrum [6] [22] [23]. 
2.1.2.2 Intermediate attack via Receiver-based spoofer:  
This equipment consists of a GPS receiver connected to a spoofing transmitter. Firstly, the 
system synchronizes with current legit GPS signals to generate spoofing signals aligned with 
the real GPS satellites, knowing the approximate 3D pointing vector of its antenna towards the 
location of the target receiver antenna. “The spoofer has to move its correlation peak away 
from the authentic correlation peak in order to grab the tracking point of the target receiver 
PLL/DLL” [22]. If the signal power is about 10 percent stronger than the legit signals the 
tracking procedure can be deceived. Projecting the counterfeit signals to the target GPS 
receiver with correct power and signal delay in the main challenge for this the construction of 
this types of devices [6] [23]. 
2.1.2.3 Sophisticated receiver based spoofers multiple with multiple antenna:  
The most advanced of all attacks, it is similar as the intermediate attack is carried out, but now 
using several coordinated spoofers to also emulate the spatial signal domain, making both the 
attack itself very difficult to carry out as well as very hard to detect for a conventional single 
antenna receiver. This type of sophisticated receiver based spoofers can transmit trough 
numerous antennas to avoid DOA antispoofing techniques. To perform this attack requires 
complex set ups and advanced setups. 
When the receiver is in the acquisition phase is more susceptible to be effectively spoofed 
because still has no lock on legit signals. In this case all previous stated attacks have great 
chances to succeed, other factors like signal strength, signal quality enter to play a decisive 
role.  
However, if the receiver is in tracking phase, chances to conduct a successful attack are smaller, 
because a higher correlation peak will not affect the tracking procedure and the receiver will 
stay locked to the authentic signal, unless counterfeit correlation peak is located very close to 
the authentic one. The spoofing signal will look like noise to receiver. In this case there can be 
performed to types of attacks when the receiver is in tracking mode [22]:  
§ Synchronous: The spoofer signal carrier phase has to be aligned with the original signal 
carrier phase, by precisely knowing the three dimension pointing vector from the 
transmission antenna in direction of the antenna of the receiver with few centimetres 
precision [24]. Also, the spoofer should know of the genuine signal power at its target 
receiver. These conditions are very hard to achieve in real world spoofing scenarios 
when the target is a UAV flying out of attackers’ range.  
§ Asynchronous: In this case, the spoofer knows a rough indication of the position of the 
victim’s receiver antenna. During an asynchronous attack, a higher power correlation 
peak will be generated, that will move along the signal looking for place itself on the 
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same position of the authentic correlation peak. This a more realistic scenario compared 
to the synchronous attack, although one drawback is that the generated noise before 
locking can be an indication of abnormal situations [22]. 
Several anti-spoofing techniques have been proposed in the open literature recently. These 
methods are usually organized in two categories: spoofing mitigation and spoofing detection. 
Spoofing detection focuses on discovering the spoofing attack while spoofing mitigation 
techniques objective is to neutralize the spoofing threat.  
2.1.3 UAV categorization  
UAV is an aerial vehicle capable of sustained flight without the need for a human operator on-
board. A UAV can be remotely controlled, semi-autonomous, autonomous, or a combination 
of these, capable of performing as many tasks. [25] 
“The connection between civil UAVs and civil GPS signal is straightforward: the vast majority 
of civil UAVs depend on civil GPS for navigation” [3]. 
UAVs can be categorized by several factors, Table 1 classification combines many aspects to 
make and general four big groups: Special task, Strategic, Tactical and micro or mini, according 
to their functions and capabilities as maximum take-off weight, maximum flight altitude, 
endurance, data link range and mission [25]. Usually, there is a direct proportion in size and 
systems complexity, where the drones with more Take of weight TOW have more backup and 
sophisticated equipment, are more reliable and less susceptible to attacks, besides the fact that 
they are out of the scope and out of range of civilian interaction and they do not belong to the 
easy distribution and accessibility equipment.  
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Table 1. UAV Classification1 
 
 
2.2 GPS spoofing detection techniques in the open literature 
Securing GNSS signal authentication is about conjugate existing mitigation and detection 
techniques and set them up with the appropriate thresholds, becoming them a fundamentally a 
problem of statistical decision theory, to accurate understanding possible false alarm [14]. 
2.2.1 Classification Summarized Description 
Spoofing detection solutions can be categorized in groups according to the hardware needed, 
the signal structure or layer level. This classification is done to understand the characteristics 
of each solution and comprehend their capacities and limitations. 
2.2.1.1 Classification by Categories: 
                                                
1 Source: taken from Bento, M., “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles an Overview”, 2008, p. 2, at 
http://www.insidegnss.com/auto/janfeb08-wp.pdf  
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Cryptographic or not cryptographic 
Cryptographic methods rely on the unpredictability of security codes, such as P(Y), that 
modulate the GPS signal. For a spoofer to successfully attack would need to estimate the 
unpredictable chips on the-fly or perform a meaconing attacks, which is record and replay the 
complete spectrum of the GPS signal. It should be noted that GPS signal authentication is 
probabilistic, therefore it is not completely invulnerable [26]. On the other side, non 
cryptographic detection does not depend on encryption or digital signatures, nor security 
enhanced GPS signals. 
Networked or stand alone 
A networked GPs spoofing detection method requires a link to a communications network to 
download, for example, time, ephemeris or almanac data from a verified source on the internet 
whereas a stand-alone defense operates in isolation of any additional network [3]. 
Multi antenna o single antenna 
Multi antenna or array processing methods are suited to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks 
by utilizing its spatial dimension. Using an array antenna, the individual direction of arrival of 
the satellites can be estimated together with the attitude of receiver attitude [27]. By comparing 
the transmitted satellite position information in the GNSS message to the previously projected, 
the spoofer can be detected and even blocked by constraining an adaptive beam-forming 
process [28].  
2.2.1.2 Classification by layers 
GPS spoofing can be investigated in the following operational layers: signal processing, data 
bit and position/navigation solution levels [8] 
Signal Processing Level 
This level is related to the structure of GPS L1 signals, including the modulation type, Doppler 
range, PRN signals, frequency, bandwidth, signal strength and many other features are publicly 
known (IS-GPS-200G & IS-GPS-705C). Therefore, knowing the structure and operational 
basics of the civilian GPS receivers, a spoofer can produce counterfeit signals that are like to 
the authentic GPS signals to mislead its target GPS receivers. Examples include: Power based 
methods, Signal Quality Monitoring methods (SQM), Time of Arrival (TOA) methods, Special 
processing methods and vestigial signal detection, among others. [8] 
Data Bit level 
Data bit level layer refers to processing of the GPS signals structure containing the GPS 
navigation message. In the L1 signal, it includes ephemeris data, almanac data, time 
parameters, service parameters and ionosphere parameters, distributed in five sub frames [19]. 
Examples of detection techniques are: Consistency check of received ephemeris, GPS clock 
consistency check and cryptographic authentication [8]. 
Position solution and Navigation Level 
The final spoofing detection level, occurring during the time and position calculation solution 
is done to be presented to the application, it can be considered along to an application layer. 
Examples include: Receiver Autonomous Integrity Check (RAIM) and consistency check with 
other solutions like other GNSS, IMU, compass, Wi-Fi position and cellular networks 
positioning [8]. 
2.2.2 Description of GPS spoofing detection techniques  
In this section are briefly described the detection method found in the open literature. 
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2.2.2.1 Low-complexity gps anti-spoofing method using multi-antenna array  
Method based on an antenna array processing technique. This technique has basically three 
parts, the first one refers to detection while the second and third refers to mitigation: (1) 
Spoofing Spatial Signature Vector (SSV) estimation: The proposed method is established 
based on the fact that all noisy PRN codes are broadcasted from the same source in space; (2) 
Null steering Unit: steers a null toward a spatial area where the highest spatial energy is coming 
from; (3) Power Maximization Unit: To avoid unintended reduction of real signals, the received 
power of each legit signal is amplified individually after the spoofing mitigation [23].  
2.2.2.2 Data bit latency defense  
In this method “the receiver looks for a data bit sign change between consecutive 
accumulations at the C/A code-length interval. If a sign change is detected at other than an 
expected data bit boundary, then the target receiver raises a flag” [6].  
2.2.2.3 Vestigial Signal Defense 
The fundament of this technique is the strain of suppressing the legit signal after effective lift-
off of the DLL tracking points. The receiver inspects the presence of legit vestige signals to 
distinguished more than one correlator peaks or monitors previously determined non-tracked 
signals until a threshold is reach [6]. 
2.2.2.4 Antenna-based joint attitude estimation  
The principel of this method is on the use of estimated Directions of Arrival for differencing 
the spoofing and legit GNSS signals. The projected DOAs which are then compared with the 
projected directions of the satellites calculated with the ephemeris data of the navigation 
message [28].  
2.2.2.5 Correlator output distribution analysis 
This detection method monitors the distribution of each correlator output. If the distribution 
differs from the distribution of the authentic signal a spoofing attacks can be triggered. A 
spoofing attack is spotted if this distribution considerably diverges from the one of the authentic 
signal. The proposed antispoofing technique detects when the spoofing attack is using fake 
correlation peak, and as mitigation technique, the vector based receiver tells to regress to the 
measurements of the discarded tracking loops [22].  
2.2.2.6 Detection of Spoofed GPS signals at code and carrier tracking level 
Intermediate spoofing attacks affect the usual signal processing of code and carrier tracking 
loops, the proposed detection method can be implemented at this level to discover spoofed GPS 
signals, by characterizing the Cross Ambiguity Function (estimate of a function when the first 
correlation peak is detected) distortion in the signal lift off [29]. 
2.2.2.7 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring RAIM 
When the number of spoofed pseudo range measurements is 1 or 2, the RAIM techniques can 
distinguish and remove the counterfeit spoofed measurements. However, when there is higher 
number of spoofed measurements, RAIM methods may not discover the presence of spoofing 
signals [8]. 
2.2.2.8 Spoofing Discrimination Based On Absolute Power Monitoring  
By monitoring the noise floor to detect uncommon noise level increments caused for the 
spoofing interference. The noise floor of the receiver can be raised by the the interference 
produced by the spoofer. Furthermore, the receiver should have the capability to discriminate 
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the signals which absolute power is two decibels higher than the greatest possible power of L1 
C/A signal on earth surface, which is 153 dBw [31]. 
2.2.2.9 GPS Spoofing Detection using RAIM with INS Coupling 
By monitoring discrepancies between GPS spoofed measurements and Inertial Navigation 
System measurements, there is proposed a set of equations to measure the likelihood that the 
position error exceeds an acceptable limit. In this detection method, RAIM redundancy is 
provided by INS measurements, different than their conventional employment where detection 
is delivered through satellite redundancy. To improve the detection abilities, a time history of 
GPS measurements can be used to estimate the position vector [32]. 
2.2.2.10 Monitor the relative GPS signal strength  
Most GPS receivers measure C/N0 as a parameter to determine signal quality. In Sky clear 
condition there will be only slightly changes in this indication, however during spoofing attacks 
a higher power signal is needed to deceive the receiver where abrupt changes in signal power 
can flag the presence of an attack [23], therefore the average signal strength could be recorded 
and compared periodically within a predetermined threshold, otherwise flag can be raised to 
alert possible attack [33]. 
2.2.2.11 Monitor the signal strength of each received satellite signal 
In some cases, spoofers make the signals from each replicated satellite of similar strength. Real 
GPS signals vary from satellite and change during time [33]. 
2.2.2.12 Monitor SV identification codes and number of received signals  
The number of simulated satellites by a spoofer can have limitations and their behaviour can 
be different from legit satellites signals. Monitoring over time the number of satellite signals 
received and the satellite IDs may demonstrate attacks attempts. This is particularly right on 
the case of an unsophisticated spoofing attack, where there is not input from the real satellite 
constellation at a specific time [33]. 
2.2.2.13 Check the time intervals 
This method refers to monitoring the behaviour of most satellite simulators or some GPS 
spoofers, it is perceived when a GPS receiver acquires all the satellite signal simultaneously, 
in normal conditions the receiver pick up the signal from each satellite at different moments 
[33]. 
2.2.2.14 Received Power Variations versus Receiver Movement 
Considering only one source broadcasting all the fake satellite GPS signal, the movement of 
the receiver in relation to the spoofer can change the signal power received from spoofing 
signals, where in normal conditions (low multipath, clear sky, etc.) no considerable changes in 
signal power will occur, because the distance is irrelevant compared with the distance from 
where the real satellites are [23]. 
2.2.2.15 L1/L2 Power Level Comparison  
Monitor the difference of power signal between L1 and L2 bands looking for amoralities in the 
predefined power difference, when usually spoofers only emulate the civil band of GPS [8]. 
2.2.2.16 Multi antenna Spoofing Discrimination 
An antenna array structure detects spoofing signals contemplating their spatial 
correlation, GPS correlators are applied to various beam outputs to sense and pinpoint spoofer 
[34]. 
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2.2.2.17 PRN Code and Data Bit Latency  
Time of Arrival technique, that checks the data bit latencies in periods of more than 20 
microseconds between the authentic GPS signal and the unavoidable delay generated by the 
spoofer when recreating a fake data bit structure. A drawback in this technique the 
predictability of GPS signal structure because the low update frequency of the frames [23]. 
2.2.2.18 L1/L2 Signals Relative Delay  
Time of Arrival Technique, it is constantly checking between the already known correlation 
peak difference of L1 and L2, looking for abrupt changes in this value [23]. 
2.2.2.19 Distribution Analysis of the Correlator Output 
This function is used to detect the presence of spoofing signals, by monitoring the fluctuations 
of a chi-squared distribution expected for the correlator output, during the different phases of 
a spoofing attack. A drawback of this technique is the fluctuations resented during multipath 
propagation can also change the chi squared distribution, so the methods work only in LOS 
conditions [23].   
2.2.2.20 Consistency Check with Other GNSS  
Constant checks against PVT solutions of other GNSS can determine spoofing threats. It is 
within the category of standalone detection solution because modern receivers are coming with 
multi GNSS reception. Generally, a spoofer only emulates GPS L1 signal, by comparing with 
other GNSS solution can be determined if the receiver is being subject of a spoofing attack, 
this is useful to identify of being target of an attack [23]. However, the effectiveness of this 
method is limited by the difficulty of mounting a spoofing attack only increases linearly with 
the number of new signal ensembles [3]. 
2.2.2.21 Consistency Check with Other position technologies 
The GPS positioning can be compared with the position solution obtained by mobile or Wi-Fi 
networks, it is limited by their service coverage and accuracy. 
2.2.2.22  Consistency Check with Other technologies 
Besides location solutions, networked detection implementations can be used to compare GPS 
data from a third party sources looking for inconsistencies. One possibility is to compare time 
from NTP online services, using stratum 1 servers time (corrected with the packet delivery 
timestamp) with the GPS received time can detect rudimentary and non accurate GPS spoofing 
attacks. Other alternative is to verify the integrity of ephemeris or almanac data comparing it 
with a trust source from the internet [33]. 
2.2.2.23 Consistency Check with other sensors 
Analysing data from auxiliary devices such as pitot static or barometric instruments, IMU or 
compass can help to determine a spoofing attack, by comparing and predicting abrupt or 
unexpected changes with the PVT solution extracted form the GPS receiver [23]. 
2.2.2.24 Spread-Spectrum Security Codes on L1C (SSSC) 
Cryptographic method which requires that a digital key generated by Spread-Spectrum Security 
Codes to be transmitted the over the navigation message. The implementation time is estimated 
in years and needs changes in the GPS interface specification [35] [36]. 
2.2.2.25 Navigation Message Authentication (NMA)  
The Navigation Message Authentication method inserts public-key digital signatures inside the 
GPS civil navigation message, which offers a convenient delivery for such signatures, using 
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the undefined messages in the GPS Interface Specification. The implementation is estimated 
to be in years [K. Wesson, M. Rothlisberger, and T. E. Humphreys, [26] [37]. 
2.2.2.26 Received Ephemeris Consistency Check 
Check if there is presented inconsistencies between the extracted ephemeris data of different 
satellites [23].  
2.2.2.27 GPS Clock Consistency Check 
Check if there is presented inconsistencies between the extracted time of different satellites to 
alert from a spoofing attack. It depends on incapability of the spoofer to keep the consistency 
of the data [23]. 
2.2.2.28 Detecting False Signals with Automatic Gain Control AGC 
Using the Automatic Gain Control component, found in many GPS receivers, to detect possible 
spoofing and jamming attacks by flagging drastic changes in their values, it should be noted 
that this changes can be causes by thermal variations. [Detecting False Signals with Automatic 
Gain Control, 2012, By Holly Borowski, Oscar Isoz, Fredrik Marsten Eklцf, Sherman Lo, and 
Dennis Akos]. The weakness, is that by only monitoring the AGC voltage or the called RF 
power, will be possible to face constant false alarms cause by for example Solar Radio Burst 
or by jammers [14]. 
2.2.2.29 Consistency check of data within the GPS PVT solution 
Monitors expected and normal behaviour of the Position, Velocity and Time solution, 
considering normal conditions, so abrupt changes in speed, or drastic changes in altitude or 
position can be signal of and successful GPS spoofing attack.  
2.2.3 Summary table 
In this section it is a summary of the detection methods investigated from the open literature, 
and are discriminated by the receiver requirement capability, if the method is cryptographic, 
networked, multi or single antenna and the layer of where they belong. 
Table 2. GPS Spoofing detection methods summary 
Name	 Description	 Encrypted	 Networked	or	stand	alone	
Single	or	
multi	
antenna	
Layer	
Receiver	
required	
capability	
A	Low-Complexity	GPS	Anti-
Spoofing	Method	Using	a	
Multi-Antenna	Array	
Estimates	the	direction	
where	all	spoofing	pseudo	
random	noise	codes	are	
transmitted,	considering	
they	all	come	from	the	
same	source	in	space	and	
steer	a	null	value	to	them	
No	 Stand	alone	 Multi	 Signal	processing	
Multiple	receiver	
antennas	
Data	Bit	Latency	Defence	
The	target	receiver	
continuously	monitors	the	
bit	lock	in	the	C/A	code	
length,	looking	for	data	bit	
sign	changes	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Data	bit	
Monitors	the	bit	
lock	in	the	C/A	
code	length	
Vestigial	Signal	Defence	
Monitor	the	presence	of	
legit	vestige	signals	to	
distinguished	more	than	
one	correlator	peaks	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Filter	out	vestige	
legit	GPS	signals	
Antenna-based	joint	
attitude	estimation		
Using	the	estimated	DOA	
for	discriminating	between	
authentic	GNSS	and	the	
spoofing	signals.	
No	 Stand	alone	 Multi	 Data	bit	 Miniaturized	antenna	array	
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Correlator	output	
distribution	analysis	
Detects	if	this	correlator	
output	distribution	
considerably	deviates	from	
the	distribution	of	the	
authentic	signal.	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Monitor	the	
distribution	of	the	
correlator	output	
Detection	of	Spoofed	GPS	
signals	at	code	and	carrier	
tracking	level	
Monitors	the	distortion	
during	the	signal	lift	off	that	
happens	in	intermediate	
spoofing	attacks.	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Requires	special	
signal	processing	
capabilities	
Receiver	Autonomous	
Integrity	Monitoring	RAIM	
Detects	spoofed	signal	
when	there	is	only	two	PRN	 No	 Stand	alone	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
RAIM	implemented	
Spoofing	Discrimination	
Based	On	Absolute	Power	
Monitoring		
Monitors	absolute	signal	
power,	between	the	typical	
and	maximum	possible	
values,	with	an	uncertainty	
of	2dB	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Receiver	should	
capable	to	analyse	
the	absolute	
received	power	
and	noise	floor	
GPS	Spoofing	Detection	
using	RAIM	with	INS	
Coupling	
Monitors	discrepancies	
between	GPS	spoofed	
measurements	and	Inertial	
Navigation	System	
measurements,	obtained	by	
RAIM	algorithm.	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
IMU	sensors	and	
RAIM	implemented	
Monitor	the	relative	GPS	
signal	strength	
Monitor	the	abrupt	changes	
in	signal	power	that	happen	
during	spoofing	attacks	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Signal	strength	
monitoring	
Monitor	the	signal	strength	
of	each	received	satellite	
signal	
Monitor	the	signal	strength	
of	each	received	satellite	
signal	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Signal	strength	
monitoring	
Monitor	satellite	
identification	codes	and	
number	of	satellite	signals	
received	
Tracking	the	number	of	
satellite	signals	received	
and	the	SV	IDs	codes	over	
time	can	detect	attacks	
attempts	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	 Monitor	SV	PRN	
Check	the	time	intervals	
Check	the	time	intervals	
between	the	acquisition	of	
each	satellite	signal	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Monitor	intervals	
between	SV	fix	
time	
Received	Power	Variations	
versus	Receiver	Movement	
Monitor	considerable	and	
abnormal	changes	in	signal	
power	when	the	receiver	is	
in	movement	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Antenna	
Movement	and	
Monitor	Signal	
Strength	
L1/L2	Power	Level	
Comparison	
Monitor	the	difference	of	
power	signal	between	L1	
and	L2	bands	looking	for	
amoralities	in	the	
predefined	power	
difference	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Receiver	must	
process	L1/L2	
bands	
Multi-antenna	Spoofing	
Discrimination	
GPS	correlators	are	applied	
to	numerous	beam	outputs	
to	spot	and	locate	spoofer		
No	 Stand	alone	 Multi	 Signal	processing	
Multiple	receiver	
antennas	
PRN	Code	and	Data	Bit	
Latency	(TOA)	
Checking	unavailable	time	
delays	of	the	spoofer	data	
bit	boundaries	with	respect	
to	the	authentic	ones	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Time	of	Arrival	
Analysis	and	
Monitoring	
L1/L2	Signals	Relative	Delay	
(TOA)	
Monitors	the	already	known	
correlation	peak	difference	
of	L1	and	L2,	looking	for	
abrupt	changes	in	this	
value.	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Receiver	must	
process	L1/L2	
bands	and		Time	of	
Arrival	Analysis	and	
Monitoring	
Distribution	Analysis	of	the	
Correlator	Output	
Monitors	the	fluctuations	of	
a	chi-squared	distribution	of	
the	correlator	output	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Distribution	
analysis	of	
correlator	outputs	
Consistency	Check	with	
Other	GNSS	
Constant	checks	against	PVT	
solutions	of	other	GNSS	 No	 Stand	alone	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
Multiple	GNSS	
receiver	chipset	
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Consistency	Check	with	
Other	position	technologies	
Comparison	of	the	position	
solution	with	the	obtained	
by	mobile	or	Wi-Fi	networks	
No	 Networked	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
Internet	
connection	
Consistency	Check	with	
Other	technologies	
Comparison	of	GPS	data	
integrity	with	the	obtained	
of	third	party	sources	
(ephemeris,	almanac,	time)	
No	 Networked	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
Internet	
connection	
Consistency	Check	with	
other	sensors	
Analysing	and	comparing	
GPS	data	with	auxiliary	
devices	like	IMU,	compass	
or	pitot	static	instruments.	
No	 Networked	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
A	devices	like	IMU,	
compass	or	pitot	
static	instruments	
Defence	Based	on	Spread-
Spectrum	Security	Codes	on	
L1C	(SSSC)	
Transmission	of	a	digital	key	
generated	by	Spread-
Spectrum	Security	Codes	
over	the	navigation	
message	
Yes	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Modification	in	the	
GPS	IS:	L1C	Data	
Channel	Spreading	
Code	
Defence	Based	on	
Navigation	Message	
Authentication	on	L1C,	L2C,	
or	L5	(NMA)	
Insertion	of	a	public-key	
digital	signatures	inside	the	
GPS	civil	navigation	
message	
Yes	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	
Modification	in	the	
GPS	IS:	2	New	
CNAV	Messages	
Received	Ephemeris	
Consistency	Check	
Inconsistencies	between	the	
extracted	ephemeris	data	of	
different	satellites	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Data	bit	
Monitor	and	
compare	
ephemeris	
GPS	clock	Consistency	
Check	
Inconsistencies	between	the	
extracted	time	of	different	
satellites	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Data	bit	 Monitor	and	compare	time		
Detecting	False	Signals	with	
Automatic	Gain	Control	
Monitors	abrupt	changes	in	
the	Automatic	Gain	Control	
values	to	detect	the	
presence	of	signal	
interference	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	 Signal	processing	 Monitor	AGC	
Consistency	check	of	data	
within	the	GPS	PVT	solution	
Monitors	normal	and	
expected	behaviour	of	the	
PVT	solution	
No	 Stand	alone	 Single	
Position	
solution	and	
navigation	
level	
Monitor	PVT	
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3 Solution Development 
3.1 Scenario description and definition  
In this section is described the situation framework where the spoofing attacks is conducted. 
Firstly, a schema is defined for picturing the interaction among the participants and their 
capabilities for delimitating their involvement and role in the analysed scenario.  
Secondly, there is a technical description of the threat actor equipment, its attack strategy, the 
Unmanned Aerial System to be attacked plus its capabilities and the detection strategy. 
3.1.1 Schema 
In order to determine and limit the interaction between the participants and their capabilities in 
the GPS spoofing attack scenario the schema defines the RF environment, the trust radios and 
the UAS WLAN network which is technically the UAS itself. 
 
Figure 1. Spoofing attack schema 
The Radio Frequency environment is the outer level, and represents the freely uncontrolled 
spectrum where the attack takes place, because the authentic signal coming from the GPS 
constellation can be counterfeited and interfered by devious signal coming from the threat 
actor.  The environment conditions are considered to be normal: with a flexible but not extreme 
weather and without third cases interferences or signal obstructions. Simplistic and meaconing 
GPS spoofing attacks do not synchronize correlation peaks because the legit signal is drowned 
by counterfeit signals, so that, distance and direction between actors will no be relevant. Range 
depends on hardware antenna to produce signal power. 
The Trust Radios level encloses where the security is not relevant and consider to be ideal, so 
there is no inquiring about safety in the telemetry, communication channel and hardware or 
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integrity, availability and authenticity in the data. Finally, the UAS WLAN network defines 
the hardware components of the UAS, important to remark that not only the Ground Control 
Station can control the UAV, but the smartphone can also be used and works harmonically as 
and add-on in the system, in the smartphone is the only mean for the operator to watch the 
video camera feedback.  
3.1.2 Threat Actor  
The threat actor or attacker is the external entity responsible to execute the GPS spoofing attack 
to the UAV in order to counterfeit and take control of the GPS PVT solution with devious 
purposes. In this case the attacker has a GPS spoofer and a GPS jammer. 
The spoofer used in this project consists of the open source Github projects sdr-gps-sim, 
developed by Takuji Ebinuma, that generates binary data representing the GPS satellites stream 
at specified location or at simulated trajectory1, which will be broadcasted through the Nuand 
BladeRF x40, a full-duplex Software Defined Radio card serving as a transmitter2. BladeGPS 
is similar project also done by Ebinuma, which main difference is that it doesn’t have the 3 
minutes’ binary file creation limitation presented in the sdr-gps-sim, because it creates and 
transmits the signal in real time. 
 
Figure 2. Jammer and Spoofer SDR card 
The spoofer is capable of recreating readable and structured GPS satellites L1 that allows a 
simplistic GPS spoofing attack. Not other GNSS or military GPS signal can be simulated in 
the current version.  
                                                
1 https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim 
2 https://www.nuand.com/blog/product/bladerf-x40/ 
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Instead of real time satellite ephemeris data, the software requires ephemeris RINEX files, 
archive maintained and publish by the NASA every 24 hours1, this meant that the data in the 
daily archive can be off as much as 24 hours from the real satellites locations[18].  
In the simulated PVT solution, the time is determined by the information on the ephemeris data 
file, however, the date can be manipulated by changing the GPS week field and the hour by 
specifying it with a sdr-gps-sim command. On the other hand, velocity and position input data 
can be a fix location, plain coordinates and altitudes from a set of 3d locations or positions in 
the $GPGGA of the NMEA format.  
3.1.3 Attack strategy 
In order to undesiring how to achieve a successful GPS spoofing attack, it has to be considered 
the practical limitations of a simplistic spoofing attack, which essentially is that if the receiver 
is in tracking phase, the counterfeit signals will not be acquired by the receiver, without force-
reacquisition technique [22]. 
The spoofer operates by transmitting structured fake GPS signals which are interpretable by 
the GPS receivers. The target receiver can be considered captured when attackers PVT solution 
is being injected into the UAS. The position velocity and time data is not indented to match the 
legit signal used by the receiver at that moment, because the drone location should be known a 
priori or complex radar setup should be needed, besides the accuracy required is a challenge 
out of the scope of this project. This means that hijacking the drone without abrupt changes in 
the PVT solution or without noticeable DoS cannot be accomplished. 
There are two attacking scenarios that could take place based on the schema and spoofer 
characteristics, and depend on the GPS receiver acquisition or tracking phase. During the 
acquisition phase the counterfeit signals are competing against the legit GPS signals, only one 
can be successfully be acquired by the receiver and then continue with the process to deliver 
the PVT solution. The signal selection decision is influenced by the higher power spoofing 
signals, since the AGC automatically regulates the receiver incoming gain according to the 
stronger signals [8] [38], and as said before legit GPS signal strength are weak enough to be 
easily overlapped by any radio transmitting at similar frequencies.  
It is important to remark that receivers have hot, warm and cold start modes. This modes 
configuration varies depending on the vendor, but generally when the GPS performs a cold 
start no previously stored information is used; in a warm start caching is quite common and is 
the reason a warm-boot of a GPS receiver takes less time to acquire lock [Tyler Nighswander, 
GPS software attacks] it can store time, position, ephemeris and/or almanac data; and in a hot 
start all possible information is stored and used to calculate the new PVT solution when the 
receiver is turned on. The implications can be prolonged latencies for acquiring an initial GPS 
lock or infinite loops as reported in some cases of spoofing when initiated the receiver with a 
warm start [2]. 
If the spoofer which emits signal at simplistic spoofing attacks level when the GPS receiver is 
on tracking mode, there is no chance to successfully take control of the receiver because the is 
already a GPS lock, therefore the counterfeit signals will be read but not processed and the the 
noise floor variable will increase considerably [8].  
3.1.4 UAS 
                                                
1 http://cddis.nasa.gov/Data_and_Derived_Products/GNSS/broadcast_ephemeris_data.html 
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The UAS in what this project was based on is the quad copter 3DRobotics solo1, which results 
can also apply to other similar designed UAVs, those whose firmware and communication 
protocol also use or are based on the Dronecode Software Platform. This suite encompasses 
open source development projects that control flight and enable mission planning, or define 
standard communication protocols like MAVLink. Besides 3DRobotics, the Dronecode 
platform has been adopted by many of the most representative organizations of drone 
technology, like Parrot, Qualcomm, Intel, DroneDeploy, Yuneec and Walkera2. 
3.1.4.1 Architecture System Diagram 
The 3DR solo Unmanned Aerial System is composed by the UAV and the controller, 
optionally, the Solo App and a GCS can be used either for visualize the video stream or as an 
interface for controlling the drone by connecting to the WLAN of the UAS3. In Figure 2, Solo 
refers to the UAV, the controller is the joystick where the communications are concentered 
from all the devices, the App is hosted in a smartphone or tablet and the GCS refers to a 
software that resides in a laptop. 
                                                
1 https://3dr.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/ 
2 https://www.dronecode.org/dronecode-software-platform 
3 https://dev.3dr.com/concept-architecture.html 
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Figure 3. Solo System Architecture1 
.  
3.1.4.2 UAS hardware components description 
The drone is a quad copter designed carry a camera as a payload. The navigation is GPS based 
but can has manual mode fly option. The relevant technical speciation as an aircraft for further 
analysis in the project are that can fly within ranges up to 8 km, its maximum speed is 89 km/h, 
maximum ascent speed 10 m/s and altitude limit is hardcoded to be up to 46 meters, this 
information will be used to determine the alert limits and thresholds at which is physically not 
possible the drone to fly2.  
Barometric pressure sensor is use to calculate the pressure altitude of the drone, this measure 
is susceptible to drifting and depends on temperature measure, therefore is it not as accurate as 
                                                
1 Taken from https://dev.3dr.com/concept-architecture.html 
2 https://3dr.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/ 
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GPS altitude indication. Some UAVs uses inputs the measurements into Kalman filter get the 
final altitude [10]. 
The GPS sensor which the drone has by factory configuration, is u-Blox NEO-7N-0-002 [39] 
this is a standalone GNSS module that even has engine for reading GPS and GLONNAS only 
can do it once at a time1. The flexibility and modularity of the system allows to upgrade the 
receiver by the newest version the NEO-N8M-0-01 (firmware v3.01), chipset used for 
following analysis and tests in this work. The main differences are the capacity of multiple 
GNSS reception, reception of GALILEO, and the built-in spoofing flag detection2. However, 
the method is only successful when the signal is genuine first and when the transition to the 
spoofed signal is being observed directly, the receiver is not working in single GNSS mode or 
when is being used the PRS feature of GALIEO [40] [41]. Additionally, there is not developed 
the capacity to bring up from the GPS receiver, the spoofing flag information to the application 
layer for the Solo App, the GCS or the controller.  
Smartphone is an optional component of the architecture that hosts the Solo App. Using the 
smartphone for commanding the drone brings up additional conveniences for providing 
external and backup resources to the primary UAS sensors, like a Wi-Fi or GSM connectivity 
and an additional GNSS antenna.  
3.1.4.3 UAS software components description 
Solo is a Linux based system running a Yocto Distribution, connected to a Pixhawk autopilot 
which controls flight modes, stabilization, and recovery. Pixhawk communicates over the 
MAVLink telemetry protocol to both the on-board Linux computer and downstream devices 
like the Controller and mobile phone Solo apps. The Linux system controls high-level 
operation of the copter: smart shots, camera and gimbal control, mobile app communication, 
and accessory interaction are all implemented in this layer3. 
There is different open source flight planning GCS software for drones, like QGroundControl, 
Mission Planner, and Tower. The proposed solution for this work is based on the 3DR services 
SDK, the user interface for Dronekit and their projects Android Dronekit and Python Dronekit. 
Android Dronekit is the API for developing and customizing the Tower Drone Control App4. 
It is important to remark that the GPS spoofing detection solution will analyse and compare 
the data at the level of the 3DR services SDK, so that, it will be not possible to use the data if 
it resides exclusively in other layers and there is required development o specific firmware 
customization transport it. 
MAVLink is a standard protocol used for communications by the Common Message Set list, 
which is the reference message set implemented by most ground control stations and autopilots. 
However, not all the information on the messages is always available along the different UAS 
platforms, it depends on the default configuration of the constructed firmware. In the case of 
the Dronekit Android API, all the MAVLink messages where listened to retrieve the available 
information for the GPS spoofing detection solution5. All the obtained messages containing 
drone values were: GPS_STATUS, AHRS, AHRS2, ATTITUDE, COMMAND_ACK, 
EKF_STATUS_REPORT, GLOBAL_POSITION_INT, GPS_RAW_INT, HWSTATUS, 
NAMED_VALUE_INT, POWER_STATUS, RADIO_STATUS, RAW_IMU, 
                                                
1 https://www.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/products/documents/NEO-7_ProductSummary_(UBX-
13003342).pdf 
2 https://www.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/NEO-M8N_ProductSummary_(UBX-16000345)_5.pdf 
3 https://dev.3dr.com/concept-architecture.html 
4 https://3dr.com/3dr-releases-tower-drone-flight-control-app-3dr-services-app-store-drones/ 
5 https://pixhawk.ethz.ch/mavlink/ 
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RC_CHANNELS_RAW, SCALED_IMU2, SCALED_IMU3, SCALED_PRESSURE, 
SCALED_PRESSURE2, SENSOR_OFFSETS, SERVO_OUTPUT_RAW, SYSTEM_TIME, 
SYS_STATUS, TERRAIN_REPORT, VFR_HUD, ATTITUDE_QUATERNION. However, 
the relevant messages for the purpose of the project are GLOBAL_POSITION_INT, this is the 
filtered global position fused with other sensors like accelerometers; GPS_RAW_INT, the raw 
sensor values as returned by the GPS; SCALED_PRESSURE, readings for the typical setup of 
one absolute and differential pressure sensor; SCALED_IMU, the raw IMU reading for the 
accelerometer setup; and VFR_HUD which are the metrics typically displayed on a HUD. 
In the scenario stated is contemplated the capacity of internet connection with either Wi-Fi or 
GSM networks. Internet is a big source of data ready to use in Android Studio platform, because 
this robust platform has extensible and diverse catalogue of libraries and API for developing 
applications and using desired data of the smartphone sensors. From internet websites can be 
retrieved data to verify the authenticity of the data obtained from the drone GPS receiver, like 
ephemeris, almanac and time. Although not accurate as GNSS, from the sensors can be used 
the location provided by Wi-Fi and GSM networks, additionally it can be extracted the GPS 
data (equally vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks) and information as the GPS status like Signal 
to Noise Ratio, number of satellites visible and satellite PRN can be acquired by calling already 
designed classes or by setting up NMEA listener.  
3.2 Select and compare GPS spoofing detection techniques  
In this section will be described the criteria to select and implement the detection method plus 
a brief analysis for selecting or not each detection method. 
3.2.1 Detection methods selection criteria 
Basically, the criteria to select the is the detection methods to be used in the proposed solution 
is that the methods’ requirements can be satisfied. The methods have to be suitable for the 
specification and configuration of this project context and scenario.   
However, not only the required capability of receiver is satisfied in order to select the spoofing 
detection method, as the solution is done through the Android Studio software, to determine 
possible spoofing attacks the input data to be processed in the calculations should be able to 
reached the application layer where the solution is being developed, in this case the Dronekit 
Android API on the Android Studio platform. Therefore, the detection methods which 
information reside in different layers will be excluded from the final selection. 
Additionally, during the selection will be discarded the encrypted, L2 signal based and multi 
antenna methods because of complexity. The encrypted methods require changes in the GPS 
architecture definition, the multi antenna solutions need sophisticated implementations out of 
the scope of this project and the L2 signal can be read only by military GPS receivers. 
3.2.2 Analysis and selection of the GPS spoofing attack detection methods 
3.2.2.1 Low-complexity gps anti-spoofing method using multi-antenna array  
This method is discarded because is a multi antenna solution, additionally, input signals 
direction estimation complexity is out of the scope of the project. 
3.2.2.2 Data bit latency defense  
Monitoring the GPS receiver bit lock is out of the scope of the project, because the required 
data can no be brought to the Android Studio where the calculations and processing take place. 
3.2.2.3 Vestigial Signal Defense 
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The process of filtering out vestige signal is done in the data bit layer and cannot be done in 
the Android Studio layer. 
3.2.2.4 Antenna-based joint attitude estimation and spoofing detection  
This method is discarded because is a multi antenna solution, additionally, to estimate the 
signal DOAs for distinguishing the spoofing and authentic GNSS signals, requires complex 
correlation of output distribution from different antennas. 
3.2.2.5 Correlator output distribution analysis 
This detection method requires monitoring the distribution of each correlator output, but 
information needed resides at the signal processing layer in the GPS receiver, reason why it 
can not be implemented in this work. 
3.2.2.6 Spoofed GPS signals at code and carrier tracking level 
This method does not apply for this project because in simplistic GPS spoofing attacks there is 
not correlator peak lift off, as this process is part or more sophisticated attacks. Additionally, 
in the the information cannot not be brought into the projects developing layers. 
3.2.2.7 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring RAIM 
Although this algorithm may detect spoofing attacks, it is accuracy is not practical [8], and the 
its design purpose is to filter out GPS multipath effect. 
3.2.2.8 Spoofing Discrimination Based On Absolute Power Monitoring  
The GPS u-Blox N8M is able to monitor the AGC and the noise floor variables used determine 
the absolute power, however this values reside in the GPS data bit layer and can not be brought 
up to the Android Studio Platform. 
3.2.2.9 GPS Spoofing Detection using RAIM with INS Coupling 
This method requires a set of equations that correlate RAIM with INS sensor measurements, 
therefore implementation requires advance processing and algorithms designs. Although this 
method is in the Position solution and navigation layer, its high complexity discards it from 
this selection process. 
3.2.2.10 Monitor the relative GPS signal strength  
Signal to Noise Ratio is a parameter that determine signal quality or strength, although the 
drones GPS provides this measurement, and the message GPS_STATUS of the MAVLink 
communication protocol has defined the last field for this value, it is not in the default list of 
MAVlink broadcasted messages through the SoloLink or Pixhawk of this UAS, therefore it 
cannot be brought to the Android API. On the other side, the smartphone GNSS antenna has 
also SNR reading capabilities which can be called directly within the class method 
GpsSatellite.getSnr() or by parsing information of the class GpsStatus.NmeaListener() of the 
Android Studio. This method is requiring information from the data bit layer that is brought up 
thought the NMEA protocol to the position solution and navigation layer. 
3.2.2.11 Monitor the signal strength of each received satellite signal 
Under the previous method philosophy, this technique can also be implemented, the difference 
is in the definition of thresholds values, because will apply for the SNR values of each satellite 
and not for the average signal strength of all SVs. 
3.2.2.12 Monitor SV identification codes and number of received signals  
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This technique can be implemented because to keep track of the number of satellite signals 
received and the id codes of the SVs, it can be used the method getPrn() from the same 
GpsSatellite() class, this information can also be obtained from the NMEA listener of the 
smartphone.  
3.2.2.13 Check the time intervals 
Monitoring when a GPS receiver acquires all the satellite signal simultaneously can be done 
by correlating the number of satellites being tracked with fix taken time, during periods of time, 
this information can be obtained from the NMEA listener.  
3.2.2.14 Received Power Variations versus Receiver Movement 
It is not possible to use the noise floor and AGC values in the Android Studio layer, so that this 
method can not be implemented in this case scenario. Additionally, range of the drone is out 
of the scope of the project.  
3.2.2.15 L1/L2 Power Level Comparison  
This method is discarded because the receiver requires processing L1/L2 signals. 
3.2.2.16 Multi antenna Spoofing Discrimination 
This method is discarded because its setup requires a multi antenna array structure. 
3.2.2.17 PRN Code and Data Bit Latency  
This method is discarded because the time of arrival of the data bit structure can not be 
calculated in the Android Studio layer where the solution is developed. 
3.2.2.18 L1/L2 Signals Relative Delay  
This method is discarded because the receiver requires processing L1/L2 signals. 
3.2.2.19 Distribution Analysis of the Correlator Output 
This method is discarded because the correlator output values needed to calculate the chi-
squared distribution reside in the data bit layer and can not be taken out from this layer.   
3.2.2.20 Consistency Check with Other GNSS  
Compares PVT solution between different GNSS to determine discrepancies and successfully 
detect GPS spoofing attacks, the effectiveness should be high because the spoofer used in the 
project is only capable of counterfeit GPS L1 signals. Although the smartphone and the drone 
GPS chipsets have multiple reception GNSS capabilities, this method can not be implemented 
because the receivers PVT solution is calculated in combination of different GNSS satellites, 
and the sources are not easily discriminated. 
A possible solution could be compare the drone GPS and the smartphone GLONNAS, 
GALILEO or BeiDou PVT solutions; nonetheless, enabling or disabling specific GNSSs in the 
smartphone can not be done from the application layer where the GPS spoofing detection 
calculation takes place. 
Other alternative could be using the NMEA listener to obtain particular GNSS location, time 
or speed, but the PVT solution is presented under the talker ID prefix GN, that indicates that 
the data proceed from multiple GNSS [42]. 
Using a different GNSS rather than GPS in the drone, it is out of the objective of the project.  
3.2.2.21 Consistency Check with Other position technologies 
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This method can be implemented by extracting the location from the smartphone Wi-Fi and 
GSM. There are specific methods which allow this feature in the Android Studio platform. 
3.2.2.22  Consistency Check with Other technologies 
In this scenario is contemplated the access to Internet from the smartphone that host the Solo 
App, therefore, comparing time from NTP online services, ephemeris or almanac with the 
drone GPS data can be implemented.  
3.2.2.23 Consistency Check with other sensors 
The transmitted MAVLink messages SCALED_PRESSURE and SCALED_IMU contain 
information that can determine barometric altitude and attitude of the drone, consequently, is 
can be correlated with the GPS PVT data. 
3.2.2.24 Spread-Spectrum Security Codes on L1C (SSSC) 
This method is discarded because requires the implementation of a cryptographic method. 
3.2.2.25 Navigation Message Authentication (NMA)  
This method is discarded because requires the implementation of a cryptographic method. 
3.2.2.26 Received Ephemeris Consistency Check 
This method is discarded because the extracted ephemeris data of different satellites can not be 
extracted to the Android Studio platform, this information resides in the data bit layer of the 
receiver.  
3.2.2.27 GPS Clock Consistency Check 
This method is discarded because the extracted time of each satellites can not be extracted to 
the Android Studio platform; this information resides in the data bit layer of the receiver.  
3.2.2.28 Detecting False Signals with Automatic Gain Control  
This method is discarded because the extracted AGC values can not be extracted to the Android 
Studio platform, this information resides in the signal processing layer of the receiver.  
3.2.2.29 Consistency check of data within the GPS PVT solution 
This method requires constant monitoring of the PVT solution values of the GPS of the drone, 
which are obtained from the MAVLink message GPS_RAW_INT.  
To summarize, the selected solutions are: Monitor the relative GPS signal strength, Monitor 
the signal strength of each received satellite signal, Monitor SV identification codes and 
number of received signals, Check the time intervals, Consistency Check with Other position 
technologies, Consistency Check with Other technologies, Consistency Check with other 
sensors and Consistency check of data within the GPS PVT solution. 
3.3 Attack Validation 
The validation of the attack conceived by the threat actor is validated in different scenarios 
based on the schema of section 3.1. The scenarios are defined according to the state of the GPS 
receiver of the drone which are acquisition and tracking mode.  
3.3.1 Attack setup architecture  
The attack setup architecture is done with no spoofing RF transmissions. A GPS antenna has 
been used to receive authentic GPS signals, the received signals are transported through cable 
to a RF combiner. In this case, the spoofing can take place without faraday cage need because 
it does not violate radio transmission regulations. It should be considered that multipath 
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propagation can not occur in this setup but this phenomenon happens in real not simulated 
scenarios.  
 
Figure 4. Validation setup architecture 
In this setup, no real spoofer transmissions in the Radio Frequency environment takes place; 
instead, the authentic GPS L1 signal is transported to a RF; then, the legit signal is fed into the 
to the RF combiner with the GPS spoofing signal and the jamming signal, the outcome of this 
process is fed into the target receivers. Spoofing and jamming signal power tries to be adjusted 
by using attenuators.  
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Figure 5. Picture of the architecture setup  
3.3.2 Attack during acquisition mode 
In acquisition, results can vary depending on the booting mode of the receiver, so that, tests are 
performed for cold, warm and hot start. Additional tests include the presence of only spoofing 
signals or the presence of both legit and counterfeit signals when feeding the target receiver. 
The tests were done with different spoofed signals PVT, time from future and past (possible 
by changing the GPS week in the ephemeris file), the position was location was in ranges of 
few meters to thousands of kilometres of distance, and the velocity have included cero and 
positive values, additionally, the receiver was power off and power on in every test. 
3.3.2.1 Cold start 
The GPS receiver has been effectively spoofing when fed only by spoofing signals, when fed 
with authentic and spoofing signals at the same time, less than thirty seconds of the took the 
receiver for acquire the position, velocity and time solution provided by the spoofer. Clearly 
the strongest signal generated by the spoofer have drown the authentic signals. The spoofing 
detection state flag of the receiver has not been raised and the GPS is the only GNSS tracked 
or showed. The noise floor value has considerably raised as stated in section 2.2.2.8. 
3.3.2.2 Warm start 
During the warm start, the GPS receiver was previously tracking legit signals, therefore the 
warm start is including previous authentic information except the ephemeris data. The receiver 
started to use the fake PVT solution in less than thirty seconds during all the tests done and 
spoofing flag not raised either. 
3.3.2.3 Hot start 
Not data from previous sessions is deleted in a hot start. The spoofer was effective in injecting 
fake PVT solution into the receiver during all tests, the value of the TTFF between 30 to 40 
seconds, in any occasion not indication for spoofing was trigger by the built-in mechanism. 
3.3.3 Attack during tracking mode 
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Simplistic attacks are no effective on tracking devices because the spoofer is not synchronized 
with the legit signals, therefore the is not possible the lift-off of the correlation peak which is 
tracked by the DLL and of the GPS receiver, as stated in section 1.2.2 and 2.12.2, unless there 
is induced a force reacquisition technique. In this section the attacks were conducted expecting 
the results claimed in theory.  
3.3.3.1 Simplistic attack on the receiver in tracking mode 
Result are in agreement with the theory, where not in one case the spoofer could be effective. 
In some cases, in few occasions the built-in spoofing flag was raised intermittently after the 
attack started. During the attacks the signal of the GPS stellates is visible but not available for 
use in navigation, only GLONNAS and GALIEO signals remain useful.  
3.3.3.2 Force re-acquisition   
To induce an acquisition phase for the receiver a jammer was turned on for 20 to 40 seconds. 
In this case of the force re-acquisition technique, the tests were also ran in the receiver with 
firmware 2.01, the spoofer could successfully inject the PVT solution in the receiver, it should 
be noted that in this firmware version the spoofing flag was triggered randomly and not 
accurately. On the other hand, when the firmware 3.01 was installed the spoofer was only 
effective when the GPS was the only GNSS enable, in the other cases the spoofing attacks was 
detected. 
3.3.4 Results 
The tests have showed that the simplistic attacks performed d by the spoofer are effective every 
time the receiver is in acquisition phase. During tracking phase, the spoofer was effective for 
the firmware 2.01 which is the currently installed by default; but not for the firmware 3.01, 
which showed a solid defence for simplistic attacks when the GPS receiver is in tracking mode. 
3.4 Solution Proposal 
3.4.1 Data samples recollection 
The sample data is recollected from legit and simulated GNSS. It is determined the minimum, 
maximum, average and standard deviation of the variables required for the spoofing detection 
selected methods of section 3.2. 
3.4.1.1 Spoofer free RF environment 
The objective of the dataset recollected is to represent the legit GNSS data obtained by the 
UAV GPS receiver during ordinary conditions, and not is expected to be used for calculating 
real and exact 3D position, therefore it is not required to follow a GPS data collection protocol. 
During the recollection location it was taken into consideration not to be significantly affected 
by LOS obstacles, weather or other antennas. The samples are taken in an urban environment 
during scattered cloud conditions. 
Table 3.Authentic GNSS data feed sample statics  
u-Blox m8n-0-01 Firmware 3.01 Average Standard Deviation 
Multiple GNSS   
SNR of all satellites 27.40 8.77 
Number of satellites in view 18.3 4.8 
Number of satellites used in PVT  15.4 0.7 
GPS   
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SNR of all satellites 26.80 10.11 
Number of satellites in view 12.5 1.7 
GLONNAS   
SNR of all satellites 28.28 7.08 
Number of satellites in view 9.5 0.9 
Galileo   
SNR of all satellites 25.64 6.16 
Number of satellites in view 2.8 1.2 
 
3.4.1.2 Spoofer data feed sample 
The input for this dataset is provided by the spoofer used in the project, therefore this 
information is only of GPS and is not relevant the environment conditions. 
Table 4.Spoofer data feed sample statics  
u-Blox m8n-0-01 firmware 
3.01 Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
GPS   
SNR of all satellites 47.47 5.6 
Number of satellites in view 8.4 3.5 
Number of satellites used in PVT 9 0.8 
 
3.4.2 Threshold definition 
Thresholds are defined using previous data samples statistics, the limits in performance of the 
drone, or the accuracy of the correlated technologies. Those thresholds are an initial reference 
which can be adjusted later with more profound analysis of input data if more accurate 
detection spoofing results are desired.  
3.4.3 Specification datasheet of the proposed solution 
In this section is proposed a group of calculations based on selected detection spoofing methods 
of section 3.2.2 with a suggested initial threshold definition of section 3.4.1. This approach 
suggests how to implement a proposed series of monitoring procedures. The alarms mentioned 
can be a sign or symptom for alerting abnormal behaviour of the receiver and possible spoofing 
conditions. 
The NMEA listener is source of several values which be used to determine if the receiver is 
under GPS spoofing attack, for example: 
§ Calculating the average of the values of the SNR parsed from the android Nmea listener, 
if this value changes 8.77 (threshold) in less than a specific time, an alarm can be 
triggered in screen: “abrupt changes in absolute signal”. This calculation refers the 
implementation solution for the Monitor the relative GPS signal strength detection 
method. 
§ If the previous calculated average exceeds 35 (threshold: average plus the standard 
deviation of the SNR of all satellites), an alarm can be triggered announcing “values 
over normal limits”. This calculation refers the implementation solution for the Monitor 
the relative GPS signal strength detection method. 
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§ Calculating the average of SNR during a specific time for each satellite ID, if this value 
changes for 8,77 (threshold) an alarm can be triggered “abrupt satellite signal changes”. 
This calculation refers to the Monitor the signal strength of each received satellite signal 
detection method. 
§ If the values of satellites in view and the satellites used to calculate the PVT solution 
are out of the thresholds limits, alert by announcing “abrupt changes in satellites in 
view”. This calculation refers the implementation solution for the Monitor SV 
identification codes and number of received signals detection method. 
§ If the satellites in view value is equal to 0 for more than specific time, an alarm can be 
triggered in screen: “possible signal interference”  
Using other positioning technologies methods by comparing the drone GPS location with 
android’s Wi-Fi, GMS or GPS locations can be a sign of spoofing attacks. These calculations 
refer the implementation solution for the Consistency Check with Other position technologies 
detection method. 
§ If the distance between GPS coordinates of the drone and the location obtained from 
Wi-Fi changes in more a specific distance (threshold) in less the time taken from the 
drone to get to this location if flying to maximum speed, trigger alarm “abrupt location 
changes” 
§ If the distance between GPS coordinates of the drone and the location obtained from 
GSM changes in more a specific distance (threshold) in less the time taken from the 
drone to get to this location if flying to maximum speed, trigger alarm “abrupt location 
changes” 
§ If the distance between GPS coordinates of the drone and the location obtained from 
GPS changes in more a specific distance (threshold) in less the time taken from the 
drone to get to this location if flying to maximum speed, trigger alarm “abrupt location 
changes” 
Compare the time between the gotten from the GPS of the drone and from a NTP server from 
internet 1, if the time difference is longer than a specific time (threshold), trigger alarm “abrupt 
time changes”. This calculation refers the implementation solution for the Consistency Check 
with Other technologies detection method.  
If there is difference of altitude between drone barometric altitude and drone GPS altitude for 
more than a specific distance (threshold) in less than the time taken to the drone to fly in 
maximum speed to that location, trigger alarm “abrupt altitude changes”. This calculation 
refers the implementation solution for the Consistency Check with other sensors detection 
method. 
Monitor abrupt or erratic changes in altitude, speed, position or coordinates, within some 
thresholds, in the form a signal quality monitoring solution. This calculation refers the 
implementation solution for the Consistency check of data within the GPS PVT solution 
detection method. 
                                                
1 http://www.pool.ntp.org/ 
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4 Conclusions  
This thesis work demonstrates the security vulnerabilities and risks of flights in GPS navigation 
based UAVs, and on the other hand, counterattacks the security issues by proposing a 
theoretical detection solution. 
Considering the spoofing threat analysed in this thesis and the tests conducted for the proposed 
scenario, it can be concluded that currently, the flights of mini and micro GPS navigation based 
UAVs are susceptible to its prominent GPS spoofing threat vector. The effect of simplistic 
attack via GPS signal simulator has been exanimated and tested in different case scenario’s, 
and it was shown attack success for some cases, depending on variable receiver, environment 
and operational conditions. The proposed GPS spoofing detection solution of this work was a 
theoretical conjugation of multiple GPS detection methods; its design was based on the 
performance specifications of the mini and micro UAV and limited by the data which could be 
used at application layer SDK development tool level. 
This chapter provides some concluding remarks as well as recommendations based on the 
material previously proposed; Section 4.1 discusses the findings on the conducted validation 
attack on different tests; Section 4.2 provides the conclusions of the GPS spoofing detection 
methods selection process and solution proposal design; and Section 4.3 gives recommendation 
and future work suggestions. 
4.1 Validation Attack findings and remarks  
From the three types od GPS spoofing attacks, the prominent threat vector for micro and mini 
UAV are the simplistic attacks done via signal simulator spoofer because recent developments 
have made cheap and without restricted distribution the resources needed to setup such a 
device. GPS is not authenticated and the there is not strict control on the RF transmission, 
therefore the GPS navigation based UAV are vulnerable to be fed by counterfeit signalling. 
The tests conducted in the thesis scenario demonstrate the spoofer was successful attacking the 
UAV when the GPS was in acquisition mode, despite the booting mode or if the receiver was 
simultaneously fed with legit GPS signals. On the other hand, the spoofer was not able to inject 
the fake PVT solution when the receiver was already tracking authentic GPS satellites, 
supporting the previous stated claims from previous works; however, using a force requisition 
technique it possible to conduct a successful spoofing attack depending on the firmware 
version, it should be noted that the tests were conducted in a recent release of new built-in 
antispoofing firmware. 
4.2 GPS spoofing solution proposal design findings and remarks 
Navigation of mini and micro UAVs can be more secure if there is a detection solution for 
alerting the operator of possible GPS spoofing attacks by reading and analysing abnormal 
behaviour in the correlated data inputted from different sources of the UAS.  
There has not be a completely implanted fool proof solution for the GNSS spoofing threat, 
however, the conjugation of multiple techniques can reduce false alarm detection probabilities. 
From various detection techniques founded in the open literature it was selected a subset which 
had applicability in the scenario of mini and micro UAVs against simplistic GPS spoofing 
attacks, because the data and hardware requirements of this methods were found in the 
postulated architecture of UAS and in the environment schema. 
There are notorious differences when comparing the data of the authentic and spoofing GPS 
samples datasets, this results can be used to determine thresholds limits of normal signal 
behaviour in the proposed software solution.  
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The proposed detection technique has application flexibility because it was developed and 
operates in the application layer like other similar open source projects, therefore its nature and 
concept are extensible to be implemented in other GCS or UAV applications, especially if the 
communication is also based on the MAVLink protocol Standard, in the same way, the 
proposed solution implementation does not require to make changes in the architecture or 
firmware of the GPS receivers.  
More methods could have been integrated in the proposed solution of this project but the 
variables which were needed reside in the other layer of the UAS or the communication 
message had had to be created in the firmware of the UAV. 
4.3 Recommendation and future work 
Implement the proposed solution and test the results based on the schema of this work to 
measure the effectiveness of the solution, additionally, robust work in statistics can be done by 
gathering, comparing and analysing samples and datasets of authentic GPS signal, counterfeit 
signals and the result of an implemented solution in order to make accurate thresholds and raise 
the probability of spoofing detection and decrease the chances of false alarm alters. 
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Table of abbreviations and terms 
AGC Automatic Gain Control 
AOA Angle of Arrival 
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight 
CAF Cross Ambiguity Function 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
DME Distance Measurement Equipment 
DLL Delay Lock Loops 
DOA    Direction of Arrival 
EGNOS   European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
GALILEO   European Global Satellite Navigation System 
GCS    Ground Control Station 
GIS    Geographic Information System 
GNSS    Global Navigation Satellite System 
GLONASS Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema  
GPS Global Position System 
IS Interface Specification 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance 
LOS Line of Sight 
MTOW Maximum Take-off Weight 
NTP Network Time Protocol 
PLL Phase Lock Loops 
PPD Personal Privacy Devices 
PPS Precise Positioning System 
PRN Pseudo Random Number 
PRS Public Regulated Service 
PVT Position Velocity Time 
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
RF Radio Frequency 
SDK Software Development Kit 
SR Short Range 
SQM Signal Quality Monitoring 
SV Space Vehicle 
TOA Time of Arrival 
TTFF Time to First Fix 
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UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
UAS    Unmanned Aerial System 
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range 
 
 
